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THE MISAPPLICATION OF ANTITRUST LAW TO
PROFESSIONAL SPORTS LEAGUES
Donald G. Kempf, Jr. *
The recent stir over the Oakland Raiders' move to Los Angeles has sparked
renewed interest in the application of the antitrust laws to professional sports.
Resolution of the controversy not only could have a far-reaching impact
on professional sports franchises and leagues, but the case's final resolution
could also have serious repercussions for the cities and states in which pro-
fessional sports teams are located. The central issue in the Raiders case' is
whether league rules restricting one team from moving into the home ter-
ritory of another violate section 1 of the Sherman Act.2 As demonstrated
below, the decision at the trial level-that such rules violate section 1-rests
on a fundamental misapplication of the antitrust laws to professional sports
leagues.
The potentially broad impact of the ultimate decision in the Raiders litiga-
tion is confirmed by the numerous other recent instances-all apparently
spawned by the Raiders' experience-of possible moves by one professional
sports team into another team's locale. For instance, in May 1982, the Col-
orado Rockies of the National Hockey League (NHL) transferred from
Denver to the Meadowlands sports complex in New Jersey, after asserting
initially that, under the Raiders decision, the club had the unilateral right
to move into the home territory of the NHL's New York teams (the Rangers
* Partner, Kirkland & Ellis, Chicago, Illinois. The author gratefully acknowledges the
assistance of Michael P. Foradas in the preparation of this article. While the author was not
involved in the liability phase of the Raiders trial, he was counsel for the Chicago Bears at
the damages phase of the trial.
1. The case is currently on appeal in the Ninth Circuit as Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum
Comm'n v. NFL, appeal docketed, Nos. 82-5572, 82-5573, 82-5574, 82-5664, 82-5665 (9th Cir.
June 14, 1982) (consolidated appeals on venue and antitrust liability issues); appeal docketed,
Nos. 83-5907, 83-5908, 83-5909, 83-5938 (9th Cir. May 26, 1983) (consolidated appeals on state
law claims and damages issues). Other aspects of the litigation are reported at 634 F.2d 1197
(9th Cir. 1980); 519 F. Supp. 581 (C.D. Cal. 1981); 89 F.R.D. 497 (C.D. Cal. 1981); 89 F.R.D.
489 (C.D. Cal. 1981); 484 F. Supp. 1274 (C.D. Cal. 1980); 468 F. Supp. 154 (C.D. Cal. 1979).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). The relevant provision that regulates the transfer of National
Football League (NFL) franchises, Rule 4.3 of the NFL Constitution and By-Laws, provides:
The League shall have exclusive control of the exhibition of football games by
member clubs within the home territory of each member. No member club shall
have the right to transfer its franchise or playing site to a different city, either
within or outside its home territory, without prior approval by the affirmative vote
of three-fourths of the existing member clubs of the League.
N.F.L. Const. & By-Laws art. IV, § 4.3 (1976 & Supp. 1982). Rule 3.1(b) declares that a
new franchise cannot be granted in an existing franchise's home territory unless three-fourths
of the league members approve. N.F.L. Const. & By-Laws art. Ill, § 3.1(b) (1976 & Supp.
1982). Rule 4.1 defines an existing franchise's home territory as encompassing a seventy-five
mile radius from its home city. N.F.L. Const. & By-Laws art. IV, § 4.1 (1976 & Supp. 1982).
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and the Islanders) and of the Philadelphia Flyers.3 In June 1982, the San
Diego Clippers of the National Basketball Association announced plans (later
abandoned) to move to Los Angeles, indicating that the trial court decision
in the Raiders case had paved the way for such a move.4 A month later,
the Toronto Maple Leafs of the NHL announced that the club was moving
its minor league franchise into an area considered part of the Buffalo Sabres'
home territory.5 Most recently, when it appeared that the New York Jets
intended to play their future home football games in the Meadowlands sports
complex in New Jersey unless New York City authorities developed a suitable
football stadium, Mayor Koch indicated that he would attempt to persuade
another NFL team to replace the Jets in New York. At that time, it was
observed that League approval for a third NFL team to move into the New
York metropolitan area was not needed in light of the Raiders case.' Affir-
mance of the Raiders jury verdict by the Ninth Circuit would undoubtedly
lead to still more franchise moves. Due to a recognition of the potentially
devastating effects that unrestrained team relocations have upon the stabil-
ity of professional sports leagues and the communities in which they are
located, several bills recently have been introduced in Congress to restrict
the relocation of professional sports teams.'
The Raiders case illustrates the inherent difficulties in applying traditional
antitrust principles to professional sports leagues. Section 1 of the Sherman
Act is directed against joint conduct "in restraint of trade." 8 The United
3. Newark Star-Ledger, May 13, 1982, at 65, 72; see also Professional Sports Antitrust
Immunity: Hearings on S. 2784 and S. 2821 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. 248-49 (1982) (statement of Gilbert Stein, vice-president and general counsel,
National Hockey League). Ultimately, however, the Rockies reportedly paid a $16 million in-
demnification to the New York and Philadelphia NHL teams for relinquishing their home area
rights. Rocky Mountain News, May 28, 1982, at I, 12.
4. Los Angeles Times, June 8, 1982, § 3, at 1, 6.
5. Toronto Globe and Mail, July 6, 1982, at P40.
6. N.Y. Times, Sept. 29, 1983, at B19, col. 5.
7. See S. 1036, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (proposing the "Sports Community Protec-
tion and Stability Act of 1983," which would clarify the coverage of professional sports leagues
by the antitrust laws in order to protect the public's interest in stable professional sports leagues);
S. 1078, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (similar to S. 1036, but requires notice of relocation
plans to affected communities and employees of the franchise); H.R. 2041, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1983); H.R. 3841, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); H.R. 3944, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
Similar legislation introduced in the Second Session of the 97th Congress during 1982 received
wide bipartisan support. H.R. 6467 was, for example, cosponsored by 160 members of the
House, including many members of the Judiciary Committee. S. 2784 was cosponsored by more
than 20 senators. 128 CONG. REC. H9466 (daily ed. Dec. 10, 1982) (remarks of Rep. Stark).
As stated by a member of the Senate Judiciary Committee, these bills "received enormous
support from public officials and civic leaders across the Nation," and more than 50
mayors, governors and county executives endorsed the legislation. 128 CONG. REC. S15783 (daily
ed. Dec. 20, 1982) (remarks of Sen. Heflin).
8. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). Section 1 of the Sherman Act only prohibits unreasonable restraints
of trade. Certain acts, such as price-fixing, because of their perceived anticompetitive nature,
are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and are thus deemed to be per se violations
of the Sherman Act. If there is a per se violation of the Sherman Act, the court is not required
[Vol. 32:625
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States Supreme Court has long recognized, however, that not every agree-
ment embodying a restraint of trade violates section L.' With this recogni-
tion, federal courts have held that some agreements in restraint of trade,
including ancillary restraints'0 to lawful joint ventures" and restraints agreed
to by businesses recognized as parts of a single entity, do not violate section
I of the Sherman Act.'
2
In applying traditional antitrust principles, a danger arises that too much
attention will be given to superficial matters, such as whether the participating
businesses are separately incorporated, and too little attention given to the
underlying economic realities of the industry in question, which should be
the determinative consideration in antitrust litigation. 3 The accompanying
to investigate the impact that the restraint will have upon the market. See Arizona v. Maricopa
County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 342-357 (1982); 54 AM. JUR. 2D Monopolies, Restraints
of Trade, and Unfair Trade Practices § 32, at 686-87 (1971 & Supp. 1983). The trial court
in the Raiders case properly rejected the plaintiffs' efforts to characterize NFL Rule 4.3 as
a per se violation. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 468 F. Supp. 154, 165-66
(C.D. Cal. 1979). Due to the uniqueness of professional sports, other courts have also con-
sistently refused to apply per se rules where league actions are challenged under the antitrust
laws. See, e.g., Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 619 (8th Cir. 1976); Philadelphia World Hockey
Club v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, 351 F. Supp. 462, 503-04 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
9. See, e.g., Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (because
every agreement affecting trade is in some manner restrictive, whether the agreement is lawful
under section 1 of the Sherman Act depends upon the nature of the industry in question and
the competitive condition of that industry before and after the restraint was imposed); Stan-
dard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911) (freedom to contract could be hampered
if parties could not agree to some restraints).
10. Bork, Ancillary Restraints and the Sherman Act, 15 A.B.A. SEC. ANTITRUST L. 211,
211 (1959) ("By 'ancillary' the common law meant subordinate or collateral to another tran-
saction and necessary to make that transaction effective.").
II. Every court of appeals that has reviewed the NFL's operations has concluded that it is a
lawful joint venture. See North Am. Soccer League v. NFL, 670 F.2d 1249, 1251 (2d Cir.
1982); Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1179 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Mackey v. NFL,
543 F.2d 606, 619 (8th Cir: 1976). Similar conclusions have been reached for other sports leagues.
See Levin v. National Basketball Assoc., 385 F. Supp. 149, 152 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); San Fran-
cisco Seals v. National Hockey League, 379 F. Supp. 966, 969 (C.D. Cal. 1974); Flood v.
Kuhn, 316 F. Supp. 271, 273 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
12. See, e.g., Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 356 (1982) (in
certain joint ventures, separate business organizations are "regarded as a single firm competing
with other sellers in the market"); United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271,
282 (6th Cir. 1898), modified, 175 U.S. 211 (1899) (agreements in restraint of trade are lawful
if "merely ancillary to the main purpose of a lawful contract").
In the Raiders case, the trial court ruled against the NFL on the "single entity" issue as
a matter of law, thereby foreclosing the NFL from presenting that issue to the jury. Los Angeles
Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 519 F. Supp. 581, 585 (C.D. Cal. (1981). For a thoughtful
analysis of the "single entity" issue, see Grauer, Recognition of the National Football League
as a Single Entity Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act: Implications of the Consumer Welfare
Model, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1983); see also Note, The N.F.L. 's Final Victory Over Smith
v. Pro-Football, Inc.: Single Entity-Interleague Economic Analysis, 27 CLEv. ST. L. REV. 541
(1978).
13. For an example of reliance upon formalistic distinctions rather than economic analysis
in examining professional sports leagues under the antitrust laws, see Blecher & Daniels, Pro-
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danger is that such superficialities may be erroneously elevated to some sort
of litmus test for choosing what label to pin on the particular arrangement
in question. Such label-pinning should be deferred until after the court has
examined the economic foundations and imperatives that underlie the opera-
tion of the particular business. The purpose of this article is to focus on
the underlying economics of professional sports leagues.
In most industries and. professions, each firm's success comes at the ex-
pense of other firms. In a professional sports league, however, each team's
success is dependent upon the success of the other teams in the league. In
the Raiders case, the trial court failed to take into account the antitrust im-
plications of this fundamental economic reality. Fortunately, other courts,
Congress and many commentators have not overlooked this reality. For ex-
ample, as Judge Grim explained three decades ago in his landmark decision
upholding an NFL rule, analogous to the rule at issue in the Raiders case,
that prohibited the televising of one team's games into another team's locale
when the latter team was playing at home:
Professional football is a unique type of business. Like other professional
sports which are organized on a league basis it has problems which no
other business has. The ordinary business makes every effort to sell as
much of its product or services as it can. In the course of doing this it
may and often does put many of its competitors out of business. The
ordinary businessman is not troubled by the knowledge that he is doing
so well that his competitors are being driven out of business. Professional
teams in a league, however, must not compete too well with each other
in a business way. On the playing field, of course, they must compete
as hard as they can all the time. But it is not necessary and indeed it
is unwise for all the teams to compete as hard as they can against each
other in a business way. If all the teams should compete as hard as they
can in a business way, the stronger teams would be likely to drive the
weaker ones into financial failure. If this should happen not only would
the weaker teams fail, but eventually the whole league, both the weaker
and the stronger teams, would fail, because without a league no team can
operate profitably.'
fessional Sports and the "Single Entity" Defense Under Section One of the Sherman Act, 4
WHITTIER L. REV. 217, 218-23 (1982), where the authors rely upon the intra-enterprise con-
spiracy concept as controlling the analysis of the sports-league structural issue. That concept
itself, however, is under strong attack from academic and other critics, and the Supreme Court
will review the intra-enterprise conspiracy concept in a case arising outside the professional
sports context, Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 691 F.2d 310 (7th Cir. 1982),
cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 3109 (1983) (No. 83-1260).
14. United States v. NFL, 116 F. Supp. 319, 323 (E.D. Pa. 1953). Thus, Judge Grim con-
cluded, "the net effects of allowing unrestricted business competition among the clubs are like-
ly to be, first, the creation of greater and greater inequalities in the strength of the teams;
second, the weaker teams being driven out of business; and, third, the destruction of the entire
League." Id. at 324; see also North Am. Soccer League v. NFL, 670 F.2d 1249, 1253 (2d
Cir.) ("[Tihe economic success of each franchise is dependent on the quality of sports competi-
tion throughout the league and the economic strength and stability of other league members.
Damage to or losses by any league member can adversely affect the stability, success and opera-
tions of other members."), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 499 (1982); Professional Hockey Corp.
v. World Hockey Ass'n, 143 Cal. App. 3d 410, 415, - P.2d -, 191 Cal. Rptr.
773, 777 (1982) ("the league as a whole will suffer if one team is financially weak").
[Vol. 32:625
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More recently, this same economic reality was recognized by Judge McGlynn
in granting the NFL summary judgment on a claim that its refusal to grant
a franchise to a proposed Memphis entry into the NFL violated the antitrust
laws. 'I In discussing Judge Grim's earlier decision, the court noted the "dif-
ferences between the production of professional sporting contests and nor-
mal business activity"' 6 and acknowledged the widely recognized view that
in order for professional sports teams to survive, the teams must make joint
decisions off the field.'"
Congress has also recognized the economic interdependence of teams in
professional sports leagues. For example, in its report on what is now 15
U.S.C. § 1291 (dealing with network television broadcasting), the Senate
stated that if weaker teams were permitted to founder, the structure of the
entire league would be weakened and its continued existence threatened.' 8
Commentators, too, have long recognized that professional sports league
members are not competitors in an economic sense. As former Solicitor
General and Professor (now Judge) Bork pointed out nearly a quarter cen-
tury ago:
The members of a league cannot compete in the way that members of
other industries can. It is neither in the interests of the members of the
league nor of the public generally that the more efficient teams should
drive out the less efficient. If one team goes out of business, all are en-
dangered. This suggests that the concept of business competition may be
irrelevant as applied to the relationships between members of a league.' 9
Likewise, in their treatise on sports law, Messrs. Weistart and Lowell have
stated:
[Tihere is a great deal of economic interdependence among the clubs com-
prising a league. They jointly produce a product which no one of them
is capable of producing alone. In addition, the success of the overall ven-
ture depends upon the financial stability of each club. The members must,
therefore, refrain from direct, interfirm economic competition and, in fact,
do utilize various cross-subsidy devices to compensate for the natural in-
equities arising from differences in the economic potential of various fran-
chise locations.
Since a league's member-clubs do not compete with one another, it seems
15. Mid-South Grizzlies v. NFL, 550 F. Supp. 558 (E.D. Pa. 1982), aff'd, 1982-3 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 65,695 (3d Cir. 1983).
16. 550 F. Supp. at 566.
17. Id.
18. S. REP. No. 1087, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1961 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 3042, 3043. Similarly, in 1964 the Senate Judiciary Committee stated that
[t]he uniqueness of the business of competitive team sports grows out of the public
interest in teams which are as competitively equal as possible, and the responsibili-
ty of the "league" of teams in maintaining both competitive balance and geographic
balance. Without competitive and geographic balance, the leagues and their weak
teams are unable to attract and hold the public interest which is necessary for their
survival.
S. REP. No. 1303, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1964).
19. Bork, supra note 10, at 233.
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inappropriate to make them subject to legal principles designed to control
the behavior of firms which are fundamentally different. In its basic nature,
a league-firm is not a conspiracy. To treat it as such is to force results
which are unlikely to achieve any purpose intended by Congress."
In sum, for firms in most industries, economic competition provides an op-
portunity to become "king of the hill." For professional sports teams it
does not. While individual manufacturers of food, steel, aluminum and the
like may prosper increasingly as other members of their industries go out
of business, the opposite is true of a professional sports league; each league
member is itself jeopardized when other teams go out of business. Thus,
the Raiders' brief to the Ninth Circuit is clearly incorrect when it states that
the way competition works among "'businessmen who sell food, steel,
aluminum, or anything else people need or want' . . . fit[s] professional
football clubs" as well.' And the Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Com-
mission is similarly incorrect when it states in its Ninth Circuit brief that
"the only difference between the NFL firms and competitors in any other
industry is that the NFL firms must agree upon certain mechanical matters,
such as hiring referees.. "22
Ironically, the essence of the important economic difference between sports
leagues and other industries is even reflected in the testimony of the Raiders'
principal owner and managing general partner, Al Davis, at the Raiders trial.
He testified that the Buffalo Bills' owner had invested heavily in the Raiders
throughout the 1960s to keep the Raiders afloat financially because "[h]e
had to have an opponent to get the most out of his franchise so that he
wanted to promote his franchise, the Buffalo Bills. . . .He needed opponents
on the field." 23 In short, fans will not come to the football stadium unless
two teams are playing. As one federal court has succinctly observed, "by
the nature of a sports contest, there must always be an adversary. By analogy,
who would enjoy Vida Blue blazing strikes across home plate when the bat-
20. J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPORTS § 5.1, at 757-58 (1979); see also J.
MARKHAM & P. TEPLITZ, BASEBALL ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY (1981); L. SULLIVAN, HAND-
BOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST § 88, at 252 (1977); Rivkin, Sports Leagues and Antitrust
Laws, in GOVERNMENT AND THE SPORTS BUSINESS 387 (R. Noll ed. 1974).
21. Brief for Appellee Los Angeles Raiders (formerly Oakland Raiders) at 26, Los Angeles
Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, appeal docketed, Nos. 82-5564, 82-5565, 82-5572, 82-5573,
82-5574 (9th Cir. June 14, 1982) (quoting Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 7
(1945)). It is noteworthy that the Raiders themselves have relied upon the economic in-
terdependence of league members in the eminent domain litigation brought against the Raiders
by the City of Oakland. In that litigation, far from asserting that league members are like
businesses selling food, steel, or aluminum, the Raiders argued that a sports franchise is in-
herently part of a web or "network" of intangible contractual rights having little in common
with traditional forms of independent business enterprises. See City of Oakland v. Oakland
Raiders, 30 Cal. 3d 60, 64, 646 P.2d 835, 837, 183 Cal. Rptr. 673, 675 (1982).
22. Brief for Appellee Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission at 11, Los Angeles
Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, appeal docketed, Nos. 82-5664, 82-5665, 82-5572, 82-5573,
82-5574 (9th Cir. June 14, 1982).
23. Second Liability Record, Vol. 25, at 5347.
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ter's box was empty, or Mark Spitz' triumphs, if he were the only one in
the pool."
24
In light of the economic interdependence of league members, athletic com-
petition on the playing field necessarily entails joint economic action off
the field. Agreements limiting economic competition "are essential to the
effectiveness and sometimes to the existence of many wholly beneficial
economic activities."" League rules restricting team movement fall squarely
into this category of essential joint agreements. Thus, in San Francisco Seals,
Ltd. v. National Hockey League,26 Judge Curtis granted the NHL summary
judgment against a claim that its rule requiring unanimous approval of fran-
chise relocations violated the antitrust laws:
[T]he organizational scheme of the National Hockey League, by which
all its members are bound, imposes no restraint upon trade or commerce
in [the] relevant market, but rather makes possible a segment of commer-
cial activity which could hardly exist without it. . . . Topco and the long
line of cases cited therein are not applicable here for they all deal with
combinations of independent business enterprises competing economically
with each other and with other businesses not included in the combina-
tion. . . . In the case before us the parties are not economic competitors,
and the territorial restraints of which the plaintiff complains have no ef-
fect upon trade or commerce in this relevant market. 7
Thus, it is critical to recognize that in order to survive and prosper, members
of professional sports leagues must act jointly, not separately. As the San
Francisco Seals court recognized, this economic reality renders inapplicable
United States v. Topco Associates, Inc.2" and other cases that hold horizon-
tal agreements creating geographic territories to be per se unlawful. In Topco,
24. Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp.
462, 503-04 (E.D. Pa. 1972); see also L. KOPPETT, SPORTS ILLUSION, SPORTS REAUTY 285 (1981);
Neale, The Peculiar Economics of Professional Sports, 78 Q.J. ECON. 1 (1964).
25. R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 332 (1978) (emphasizing that boycotts or refusals
to deal may be essential to the survival of sports leagues); see also J. MARKHAM & P. TEPLITZ,
supra note 20, at 19 ("the 'product' of baseball-the game-necessitates cooperative rather
than 'independent action.' "') (emphasis in original); 16E J. VON KALINOWSKI, BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS: ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATIONS § 50.01, at 50-52 (1983) ("rules
and regulations concerning the conduct of league affairs . . . are essential in order to guarantee
that each team will remain in a strong competitive position").
26. 379 F. Supp. 966 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
27. Id. at 970. Weistart and Lowell agree with the San Francisco Seals result:
[Tlhe realities of the major sports leagues' operations would seem to lend support
to the conclusion reached in San Francisco Seals. The primary goal of section 1
of the Sherman Act is to insure that true economic competitors maintain a healthy
distance from one another. The section was not intended to condemn all cooperative
efforts in the business world. If a particular group of entrepreneurs are joint in-
vestors in a common venture which could not be carried on by any one of them
alone, the cooperation which results hardly seems improper. In these instances, it
is proper that the "agreements" in question are viewed as essentially internal
marketing decisions.
J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 20, § 5.11, at 701 (footnote omitted).
28. 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
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absent the joint marketing program, each member in a cooperative associa-
tion of independent supermarkets would have benefited had other members
been driven out of business.29 Professional sports leagues present the other
side of the coin: league members do not benefit if other teams are driven
out of business, and it would be economically irrational for teams to drive
one another out of business.
A professional sports league is a coproduction business in which joint gate
receipts and television contracts are the key factors determining the economic
strength of all clubs.3" If the potential consumers of NFL. football in a local
area are inadequate to support multiple teams, the ability of at least some
(and perhaps all) of those teams in that local market to secure needed local
gate receipts and revenues will be severely hampered. Moreover, there will
be adverse effects not only on the teams directly involved, but on all the
teams in the league. Should one of the teams fail, the adverse impact on
that team and on those other teams scheduled to play it would be obvious.
But even short of that, any decreases in crowd size resulting from such local
area competition would have adverse consequences throughout the league.
For example, visiting teams, which receive forty percent of gate proceeds
in the NFL,3' would suffer a direct decline in revenues. Furthermore, less-
than-capacity crowds would lead to television blackouts,32 thus threatening
the lucrative television contracts that benefit all NFL teams. In short, it makes
no sense to suggest that there should be forced competition between NFL
teams in local markets for fans, ticket sales, and the like. The league's pro-
duct, and its ability to compete with other forms of entertainment at the
gate and on television, would be greatly-and senselessly-damaged with two
or more teams struggling to capture a limited market.
Finally, if permitted to stand, the Raiders verdict may well have an-
ticompetitive consequences for the entire entertainment industry. Healthy pro-
fessional sports leagues have procompetitive effects on other forms of enter-
tainment. So long as professional sports leagues remain strong contenders
for the entertainment dollar, they exert competitive pressure on other enter-
tainment forms. By jeopardizing the viability of professional sports league
members, the Raiders decision could undermine the teams' abilities to com-
pete effectively with other entertainment outlets. 3 Such anticompetitive con-
sequences are manifestly contrary to the purpose of the antitrust laws.
29. Id. at 602.
30. Shared revenues from attendance and television account for more than 90% of the NFL
clubs' average revenues. See N.Y. Times, May 2, 1982, § 5, at 8, col. 1. In 1982, the NFL
signed a five-year network television contract worth approximately $2 billion. See N.Y. Times,
Mar. 23, 1982, at 23, col. 6. Average yearly income to each team under this contract will
exceed $10 million, making it the most lucrative contract in sports and, indeed, in "show-
business history." Id.
31. N.F.L. Const. & By-Laws art. XIX, § 19.1 (1976 & Supp. 1982).
32. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1292 (1982).
33. As Justice Rehnquist noted in another NFL case, the NFL owners "produce a product,
professional football, which competes with other forms of entertainment in the entertainment
[Vol. 32:625
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In sum, an examination of the economic imperatives operating on profes-
sional sports leagues shows that location controls, including rules that pre-
vent one team from moving into the home territory of another team, should
not be held to violate section 1 of the Sherman Act. The relevant cases,
statutes, and commentary consistently support this conclusion. The contrary
decision at the trial level in the Raiders case represents a misapplication of
the antitrust laws resulting from a failure to take proper account of the
underlying economic realities of professional sports leagues. An analysis of
the significant economic differences between sports leagues and other in-
dustries makes it clear that clubs of a common sports league should not
be treated under the antitrust laws as if they were independent business com-
petitors and that Section 1 condemnation of sports league rules restricting
franchise movement is unsound antitrust policy.
market. Although individual NFL teams compete with one another on the playing field, they
rarely compete in the marketplace." NFL v. North Am. Soccer League, 103 S. Ct. 499, 500
(1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).

